An Analysis of Proposition Set 2 in Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’
In proposition 2, Wittgenstein establishes his take on;
What is an atomic fact?
We are given the answer that ‘an atomic fact is a combination of objects’, which constitutes being a combination of ‘entities’ and ‘things’.
“In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing.” (2.012)
While one might claim that he is deriving a totality (the totality of the existence of atomic facts) from a possibility (the possibility of a thing to combine with another thing into an atomic fact), that would simply be a misrepresentation of what he is trying to construe. By claiming that the possibility to become an atomic fact is a property of a thing, it follows that in totality, every thing has the possibility to become an atomic fact and that possibility necessitates the existence of atomic facts.
“It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit. If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.” (2.0121)
It may seem accidental that a thing that exists independently could be combined with another independently existing thing into a larger state of affairs (an atomic fact) but clearly, this possibility to become a larger state of affairs lies within the independent thing as, without it, it could never become an atomic fact (through combination).
“…(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)” (2.0121)
Wittgenstein is explaining that in logic, every possibility is considered and that the entire concept of a possibility in reference to logic is that possibilities make up the facts of logic. It follows from this stance that you can derive a totality or a fact from a possibility, only in the realm of logic (he is not trying to warrant consequentialism, don’t strawman him plz).
“Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things. If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context.” (2.0121)
When we think about things or objects, we think of them in reference to a larger concept. An atom exists within a space, it is in turn dependent upon space. When we think about an object such as an atom, a spatial object, we think about it in reference to space. The same follows for time and temporal objects. The proposition then turns to say that similarly, we cannot think of a thing or an object apart from its possibility for combination for another thing or object. If an object can be part of an atomic fact (which it will always hold the possibility for) then objects exist in reference to their possibility to become atomic facts.
“The thing is independent, in so far as it can occur in all possible circumstances, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with the atomic fact, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to occur in two different ways, alone and in the proposition.)” (2.0122)
The thing, or object, exists independently (as was established at the start of 2.0121) but its independence holds the property of a possibility for connexion with an atomic fact, making it dependent in a way. However, it is linguistically impossible for a word (for the object) to occur both alone (independently) and in a proposition (in the atomic fact; dependently) at the same time. It violates the Law of Contradiction.
“If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts. (Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot subsequently be found.” (2.0123)
If an object is known then all its possibilities for connexions to atomic facts are known as well given that every single possibility lies in the nature of the object (making it a property of the object). No new possibilities can be derived or found after the object is known as it harbors every single possibility for connexion to an atomic fact, no exceptions.
“In order to know an object, I must know not its external but all its internal qualities.” (2.01231)
In order to ‘know’ an object you must not know its attributes, but its properties. The external qualities of an atom are not necessary to know the atom. The attributes or external qualities of the atom are not necessary and provide no insight into the internal qualities of the atom. I am taking internal qualities to mean the properties of the atom. I cannot claim to know what the properties or the prerequisites of “atom” are but I can claim that if I did, I would in turn know every possibility of the apple in connexion to an atomic fact. Given that the possibilities themselves are properties, if I knew the internal qualities or properties of the atom, it follows that I would know all of its possibilities to connect to atomic facts (to form them). As stated in 2.0123, knowing an object allows one to know all of its possibilities. Knowing its possibilities means knowing its properties (this is to back up my claim that internal qualities are properties).
“Every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space.” (2.013)
Here, Wittgenstein is explaining that every object or thing exists within a space of atomic facts. You can view the thing as existing independently of the space or of the space as being empty but you cannot think of the thing without thinking of or acknowledging its relation to the space; you cannot think of the thing without the space.
“A spatial object must lie in infinite space. (A point in space is a place for an argument.) A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour; it has, so to speak, a colour space round it. A tone must have a pitch, the object of the sense of touch a hardness, etc.” (2.0131)
Every object (with the exception of temporal objects) lies in infinite space. A speck must have a colour space around it. A tone exists spatially in reference to pitch, the object ‘sense’ exists spatially in reference to its hardness. Spatial objects exist in infinite space and as long as it exists, it will continue doing so in reference to infinite space.
“Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs … The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object.” (2.014 & 2.0141)
As I’ve been stating, the possibilities for connexion to atomic facts are themselves a property of the object. If the object did not possess all the possibilities for this connexion, its very existence would be hindered upon and it would no longer be that object but another one. For example, let’s say we have object A. Object A has the possibility for x, y, and z. Now if it loses the possibility for z, it is no longer object A. Now this new object, object B has the possibilities for x and y because the hindrance to object A (the loss of z) also changed the properties of object A. As is analytically true, to rid an entity or an object of one of its properties is to do away with a prerequisite of what it means to be that object or entity, so it will become a different one.
The object is simple … Every statement about complexes can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes. (2.02 & 2.0201)
Every statement or atomic fact or complexity can be analyzed so as to recognize their independent parts and the parts of the proposition which make up/describe the complex. Those things and objects making them up, existing rather independently, are ‘simple’.
“Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound.” (2.021)
The world itself is the totality of facts but objects, independent objects, and their totality make up the substance of the world. These objects themselves aren’t compound (atomic facts) but rather the constituents of atomic facts. These objects are simple.
“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.” (2.0211)
Without substance, the sense of a proposition would be contingent upon the validity of another proposition. No proposition could be independently true (not contingent). Not all propositions are propositions of contingency but without substance, they would be bound by the principle of contingency. In turn, because of causality, since every proposition has a causal relationship with another, and there aren’t an infinite number of propositions, then we can deduce that there is substance.
“It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true or false).” (2.0212)
If the world has no substance and the sense of every object is contingent upon the truth of another, then concepts such as truths versus falsities (true or false). When Witty talks about a ‘picture of the world’ he’s specifically referencing the relation of an independent object to its truth or its falsity.
“It is clear that however different from the real one an imaginary world may be, it must have something — a form — in common with the real world.” (2.022)
The imaginary worlds that Kripke builds upon must have something in common with the real world. The Possible Worlds Theory needs any possible world to have at least 1 form in common with the real world. Imagine a world with no logical, nomological, or temporal possibilities, no atomic facts or possibilities for connexions to atomic facts, no properties, just absolutely nothing in common with the real world; it’s impossible to theorize and cannot exist. It violates the law of impossibility.
“The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions — first formed by the configuration of the objects.” (2.0231)
What I take this to mean is that the substance can only determine the form, whereas the propositions and the configuration of objects make up the material properties of the said form.
“Two objects of the same logical form are — apart from their external properties — only differentiated from one another in that they are different.” (2.0233)
Wittgenstein is asserting that two objects of the same form, with the same internal properties, or just the same properties differentiate from one another in that they are different. For example, if we say that it’s a property of a triangle to be three-sided, and we have two three-sided shapes, even though the two shapes possess the same internal property of being three-sided, they still differentiate from one another given that they are different.
“Either a thing has properties which no other has, and then one can distinguish it straight away from the others by a description and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things which have the totality of their properties in common, and then it is quite impossible to point to any one of them. For if a thing is not distinguished by anything, I cannot distinguish it — for otherwise it would be distinguished.” (2.02331)
Building up off of proposition 2.0233, as he’s stated, if a thing has all the same internal properties, or just properties, as another thing, we can distinguish that it is different from the other because they are different. However, Wittgenstein is now saying that if there are two things that possess all the same internal and external properties, or properties and characteristics, we cannot differentiate between them, because if a thing has no distinguishing characteristics, it cannot be distinguished (referred to or recognized as independent).
“Substance is what exists independently of what is the case … It is form and content … Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects.” (2.024, 2.025, 2.0251)
Here Wittgenstein defines substance so as to clarify for the rest of the proposition(s). Without anything that is the case (objects and things and in turn atomic facts), there’s still a number of things that exist. Substance itself is also simply the form and content of the real. Even if the real is devoid of all that is the case (objects, things, and atomic facts), space and time and colour (or a lack of colour) will always make up the real. Those three along with existence (nonexistence) simply are. Not only do they constitute the real but for the real to lose any of its content or form would mean the destruction of the real itself. Space and time and colour or to be devoid of colour are inherent to the real.
“Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world … The fixed, the existent and the object are one … The object is the fixed, the existent; the configuration is the changing, the variable.” (2.026, 2.027, 2.0271)
Without objects, nothing is fixed, there is no content or form, everything is constantly changing and there are no spatial or temporal or nomological objects or possibilities as well as no colour. The world itself wouldn’t even exist. We cannot even begin to theorize of a space in which none of these would exist. The only content of that space would be existence, nothing else. There wouldn’t be a lack of colour, space, or time either though. It’s quite literally impossible to theorize.
“The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact … In the atomic fact objects hang one in another, like the members of a chain … In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way … The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact.” (2.0272, 2.03, 2.031, 2.032)
The configuration of the existent (the changing of the real) is what forms atomic facts. Wittgenstein says that in an atomic fact, objects hang within each other like members of a chain (think a chain link). Objects in an atomic fact are combined in such a way that we can refer to the connexion between them or define them (since they’re combined in a definite way). The structure of the atomic facts depends on the objects existing in connexion to the fact and how they hang together. Essentially, objects and their connected structure are the structure of the atomic fact.
“The form is the possibility of the structure … The structure of the fact consists of the structures of the atomic facts.” (2.033, 2.034)
We’ve discussed how the possibility for and the connexion to an atomic fact is a property of every thing or object. Now the form, or the content (of the real), is the possibility of the structure, as without the form, the atomic fact would have no structure and we would not be able to differentiate between spatial objects, temporal objects, or colours. The structure of the (spatial, temporal, or nomological) fact consists of the structures of atomic facts as atomic facts make up everything aside from the co-dependent objects and things that make up atomic facts.
“The totality of existent atomic facts is the world … The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist.” (2.05, 2.06)
Every existing atomic fact makes up the structure of the world and the world itself as if the world was constituted by independent-codependent objects and things that have the possibility for connexion to an atomic fact, then those things would come together and as we know, if two objects or things come together, they form an atomic fact. The only way to get around this would be to say that the world is made up of one singular object or thing, but that’s impossible. Additionally, since objects and things hold the possibility for connexion to an atomic fact, and they cannot act out all of the possibilities they contain, the existence of an atomic fact through the combination of two objects takes the place of an alternative combination with those same two objects. While we cannot infer the non-existence of certain facts, there still resides the possibility for said facts within the object/thing making up the atomic fact.
“The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.) … Atomic facts are independent of one another … From the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another … The total reality is the world.” (2.06, 2.061, 2.062, 2.063)
Wittgenstein is saying that reality itself is made up of form and of positive and negative facts, not to be confused with atomic facts. Atomic facts are concerned with the connexion of objects and things and their possibility for said connexion. Positive and negative facts are concerned with the existence of atomic facts. If the real was devoid of the non-existence of atomic facts (negative-facts) then it would lose its form as the positive and negative facts are directly connected to the forms of space, time, and colour. Next, he says that atomic facts exist and operate independently of each other. While they may come together and create a larger world or their existence (the positive facts create), the larger reality, the atomic facts themselves are still independent of one another. Next, Wittgenstein says that the existence or non-existence of atomic facts (positive/negative facts) cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another atomic fact. The reason for this is because for us to be able to infer these positive or negative facts, we would have to know all of the possibilities for connexion contained within the object/thing making up the original atomic fact (because it makes up its properties). We cannot know all possibilities as we are limited by our understandings of spatial, temporal, logical, or nomological possibilities. We cannot understand these in totality because that would require understanding its opposite and the dichotomy between the two in its totality. We cannot, in totality, understand non-existence or illogicalness. Wittgenstein ends this part of set 2 (2.06–2.063) by stating that the total reality is the world. In proposition set 1, Wittgenstein said that the totality of the world is facts, not things. This makes definitive sense because reality is made up of forms, which are negative and positive rights (concerning the (non)existence of atomic facts); these rights make up the world and they make up the reality that is the world.
“We make to ourselves pictures of facts … The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts … The picture is a model of reality.” (2.1, 2.11, 2.12)
We observe facts so as to make pictures of them, which shows the facts in logical space (or through the lens of logical analysis) as well as the positive or negative facts, which make up the substance of the space or picture. Subsequently, the picture itself is simply a model of reality as it is denoting atomic facts and its parameters are positive and negative facts, which define/make up reality itself.
“To the objects correspond in the picture the elements of the picture … The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects.” (2.13, 2.131)
The elements of the picture (its constituents) correspond to the objects (that make up atomic facts). Since the picture is the pushing of or the analysis of atomic facts in logical spaces, it only makes sense that the base or the elements of the picture would be the base or elements of the atomic facts. The elements of the picture are the object which is the element of the atomic fact.
“The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way … The picture is a fact.” (2.14, 2.141)
The picture reflects and consists of the combination of its elements with one another in a definite way. As we know, the combination of two things (things being the elements of the picture) is characterized as an atomic fact, however, since this picture isn’t existing on an atomic level, this picture, which is made up of (atomic) facts, is a fact itself.
“That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another. This connexion of the elements of the picture is called its structure, and the possibility of this structure is called the form of representation of the picture.” (2.15)
The elements combine with one another to create and structure the picture in question and this connexion between elements represents the things/objects that combine with each other to create atomic facts which are represented by the picture; by its structure (as per 2.1, 2.11). The connexion between elements is called its structure (similarly to how the structure of an atomic fact is the connexion between its constituent objects/things) and the possibility for this structure is the form of representation of the picture, which just means that this is the form of what the picture represents (in reference to the picture), which is atomic facts and positive and negative facts. This makes sense because, as we’ve established, we can draw connections from the elements to objects/things, connections from the connexion of things/objects to the connexion of elements, and from the picture to atomic facts. It follows that similarly, the possibility for structure contained within elements would be the form of representation of the objects/things which hold the possibility for structure (that of atomic facts) as possibility forms the representation of or denotes another type of possibility.
“The form of representation is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture … Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it.” (2.151, 2.1511)
The form of representation is the possibility for connexion between things/objects as well as the possibility for connexion between the elements of the picture. This concept that we’ve been building up off of the whole time now has a name. The form of representation can only be theorized in reference to a picture as it’s not just denoting the possibility for connexion to make atomic facts but also the possibility for connexion to make logical pictures. It follows from this that the picture reaches up to reality. Firstly, a refresher. “The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)” (2.06). Reality is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts or positive and negative facts. The possibility for connexion in order to form atomic facts does not actualize a positive or negative fact; only when there’s been a connexion do we know there are both positive and negative facts. The form of representation of the picture is the possibility for connexion that exists below positive and negative facts. Only with connexion is reality actualized. The possibility for this connexion exists under and reaches up to reality; it is inextricably linked to reality.
“It is like a scale applied to reality … Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch the object to be measured.” (2.1512, 2.15121)
The picture is like a scale applied to reality in the way in which it weighs the possibilities for what reality can be by its form of representation; the possibility for the actualization or non-existence of atomic facts, which is the reality. Possibility A denotes a reality where the positive fact or negative fact of atomic fact A makes up the reality whereas Possibility B denotes a reality where the positive fact or negative fact of atomic fact B makes up the reality. The picture, containing the possibilities for connexion between objects/things in its form of representation, weighs these possibilities, the possibilities for two different forms of reality that possess differing positive and negative facts almost like a scale would. The dividing lines in question are the outermost edges of the picture, so when examining the outermost points of the picture, we take those to mean the corner of the picture. When measuring this corner, or the object the intersecting points touch, you set the parameters for what the picture is (spatially).
“According to this view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture … The representing relation consists of the co-ordinations of the elements of the picture and the things … These co-ordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality.” (2.1513 2.1514 2.1515)
According to the analysis of the picture in this way, the representing relation which makes it (the picture) a picture also belongs to the picture. A representing relation is made up of the coordination of the elements of the picture and the things (which make up atomic facts). The coordination of these elements and things are the feelers of the elements with which the picture touches reality (refer to 2.1511, the picture reaches up to reality). The coordination of the elements and things that make up the representing relation of the picture also make up the picture and allow it to ‘touch’ reality (in a figurative sense).
“In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures … In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.” (2.16, 2.161)
In order to be a picture, a fact must have something in common with what it pictures. Say we are referencing a forest. In our picture of the forest, we must have something in common with what we are picturing (the forest). That could be pine trees, green shrubbery, a lake, etc. Clearly, the picture must have something in common with the thing being pictured. Subsequently, there must be something identical between the picture and the pictured in order for there to be a picture at all. This ties into 2.16; the picture of the forest must possess something identical to the forest being pictured.
“What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner — rightly or falsely — is its form of representation.” (2.17)
The form of representation of the picture is what the picture must have in common with reality to be able to represent it after its manner. I take the manner of reality to be its very essence in terms of the totality of facts that make it up, including positive and negative facts. At the very base of the representation, the positive and negative facts which make up the form of reality then make up the form of representation or at least the representation of these facts makes up the form of representation.
“The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc … The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it forth.” (2.171, 2.172)
If the picture shares any sort of form with a reality, it can represent it. The picture can represent all that is spatial, all that is colored, etc. however, it cannot represent its own form of representation, as the representation itself is what the picture must have in common with reality. It sharing a form with reality is what is being represented, which is its form of representation. Essentially, the representation of a form cannot be represented or displayed through the very thing that possesses the representation of a form. A picture that is concluded from 3-dimensional space cannot display or reflect a form that it holds, only through a 4th-dimensional analysis could the form of representation of a 3d picture be represented.
“The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is its form of representation), therefore the picture represents its object rightly or falsely … But the picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation.” (2.173, 2.174)
The picture either does or does not represent the object in question. And even if it seems like it is representing the object, it doesn’t follow that it is representing it rightly. Either it represents it rightly or falsely. Say we have a picture (or a representation) of a red apple. It is an indecipherable red blob in a seemingly square shape. Given that red apples are not square (more circle-shaped), we could say that this picture is falsely representing red apples. The picture, however, is bound by its form of representation. If the picture does not possess and is bound by its form of representation then it cannot represent reality after its manner (neither rightly or falsely) which would mean that it simply cannot represent reality which means it could not be a logical picture.
“What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all — rightly or falsely — is the logical form, that is, the form of reality … If the form of representation is the logical form, then the picture is called a logical picture … Every picture is also a logical picture. (On the other hand, for example, not every picture is spatial.)” (2.18, 2.181, 2.182)
The picture’s form of representation is what it must have to represent the manner of reality rightly or falsely and its logical form (form of reality) is what it must have in order to be able to represent reality at all. Without a logical form, a form of representation cannot be present and if there’s no logical form there can be no form of representation. Since the form of representation and logical form co-exist, and every picture that possesses the same logical form as the form of representation is called a logical picture then every picture is a logical picture. Not every picture has to be spatial, just as long as it is a logical picture then it qualifies as a picture.
“The logical picture can depict the world.” (2.19)
The logical picture can depict the world as every logical picture possesses a form of representation and a logical form, meaning that it has everything it needs to represent reality and in turn represent the world (the totality of facts). Given that one of the most agreed-upon definitions of represent is “to depict (a particular subject)”, we can in turn say that if the logical picture can represent the world then it can also depict the world.
“The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures … The picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.” (2.2, 2.201)
The picture’s logical form of representation is what it possesses in common with what it is picturing (say it possesses a red-spherical shape when picturing a red apple). The picture depicts reality itself by representing a possibility of positive and negative facts. Wittgenstein has already established that the world and the form of reality is made up (at least in part) of this possibility for positive and negative facts so it follows that if the picture is depicting reality, it must be representing this possibility.
“The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space … The picture contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it represents.” (2.202, 2.203)
Since the picture represents a possibility for the existence and non-existence of atomic facts (positive and negative facts), and the state of affairs in question is the totality of atomic facts represented or not represented, it follows that the picture is representing a possible state of affairs since the amount of positive and negative facts can create a whole new state of affairs rather than the one being pictured. To simplify, the possibility for atomic facts leads to a possibility for a state of affairs; this is what’s being represented (in logical space). The picture itself contains the possibility of the state of affairs it represents through its depiction/representation of positive and negative facts. Since it represents a possible state of affairs, the possibility of said state of affairs is contained within the picture; the representation of possibility means that that possibility is contained within what is doing the representing (the picture).
“The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false.” (2.21)
The picture either accurately or inaccurately depicts reality. The picture is either right or wrong, true or false. The picture’s depiction of reality is determined as true or false through analyzing the logical form and the form of representation of the picture.
“The picture represents what it represents, independently of its truth or falsehood, through the form of representation … What the picture represents is its sense.” (2.22, 2.221)
The picture represents what it represents independently of whether or not its depiction of reality is accurate or inaccurate; true or false. It represents what it represents through its form of representation, which exists for all logical pictures, regardless of whether or not the picture is true or false. What the picture represents is called its ‘sense’. This red apple that I’ve been using as an example for a couple of these past propositions would be the sense of the picture. Now, as stated earlier, the picture can represent the apple incorrectly or falsely, but its form of representation dictates that it is still representing the apple, as it must be represented before being recognized as being represented incorrectly.
“In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists … In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.” (2.222, 2.223)
The truth or falsity of the picture consists of the agreement or disagreement between its sense and reality. So, say that the picture is representing a red apple (its sense) yet in reality, it is a green apple. The sense of the picture (the red apple) can differ or disagree with reality (a green apple) and in that agreement or disagreement, consists the truth or falsity of the picture. Essentially, the sense disagreeing with reality means that the picture is a falsity (in its representation) and the sense agreeing with reality means that the picture is true. In order to discover whether or not the picture is true or false, you must compare it with reality as the sense can be analyzed through the picture’s form of representation that exists within the picture. In order to compare the sense with reality, you must compare the picture with reality, and through that agreement or disagreement between the sense and reality consists of the truth or falsity (of the picture).
“It cannot be discovered from the picture alone whether it is true or false … There is no picture which is a priori true.” (2.224, 2.225)
The picture cannot be deduced as being either true or false through an analysis of the picture alone. You must compare the picture, or what it encompasses; the sense, with reality in order to draw a true or false conclusion of the picture. To determine its truthhood or falsity without comparison to reality is impossible. There is no picture that is a priori true as in it cannot be deduced that a picture is true through a priori reasoning. He means that one cannot deduce that a picture is true without referencing or comparing the picture to reality; theoretical deduction cannot be the determining factor of the picture's truth as it must have a comparison to reality.
